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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintif !-Appellant, 
vs. 
HARRISON LARGO, HARRY TSOSIE, 
CHAVEZ WHITEHORSE, R E I D 
BARBER, MOSE CLARK and 
CLARENCE PETER, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11832 
The a ppellantt seeks a reversal of ian order in arrest of 
judgment entered in the Firist Judicfal District Court, in 
and for the County of Box Elder, Staite of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondents Chavez Whitehorse, ReM Barber, Mose 
Olark, C1arence Peter and Harry Tsosie were convicted of 
the crime of assault with intent to commit rape, and re-
spondent Harri1son Largo was convicted of simp,Je assault. 
AU defendants were tried together Wlith the benefit of a 
jury. Subsequent to a verdict of guilty, defense counsel 
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moved the court for an order in arrest of judgment. The 
motion was granted. It is from that order that the State 
now prosecutes this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant submits that the decision of the trial 
court granting the motion for an order in arrest of judg-
ment was error. Thus, the order granting the motion should 
be reversed and the jury verdict of guilty reinstated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On AprH 7, 1969, following an evening basketball 
game at the Intermountain Indian School located at Brig-
ham City, Uta:h, the electricity was interrupted, thus plung-
ing Brigham City as well as the Indian Sclmo1 'into darkness 
(T. 231). During the blackout period, several ma1e :students 
entered one of the girls' dormitories and accosted three 
female students, two of Which were subsequently raped 
(T. 231-233). 
Officer Tom Sneddon of the Brigham City Police De-
pa11tment conducted a formal investigation of the incident 
commencing April 8, 1969 (T. 217). He began questioning 
sixty to eighty students on April 9, 1969, and continued 
at various intervals through April 12, 1969 (T. 217, 218). 
The names of the students questioned were obtained pur-
suant to student dormitory meetings which were conducted 
by guidance counsellors who were employees of the school 
charged with the responsibility of various dormitories (T. 
185) . Each student questioned was asked to come to the 
ioffice of the guidance supervisor where Officer Sneddon 
was conducting the investigation (T. 186). The guidance 
supervisor and the guidance counselor of each respondent 
were present during the questioning (T. 313, 323, 343, 347, 
360, 364). The purpose of the counselors' presence was to 
insure that nothing transpired which the student could not 
or did not understand (T. 245, 246). 
The students were first taken to a room adjacent the 
guidance supervisor's office, where the questioning was 
being conducted. They waited until their turn came 
for questioning (T. 193, 246, 247). During this waiting 
period, the guidance counselor was with the student to be 
questioned. Most of the students, including the respondents 
in the instant case, were advised by their guidance coun-
selor to tell 1the truth if involved in the investigation (T. 
328, 343, 375). At no time was a student advised by his 
counselor of the rights embodied in Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U. S. 436 (1966). However, when each respondent 
entered the guidance supervi-sor's office for questioning, 
Officer Sneddon advised him of his Miranda rights by read-
ing from a prepared card (T. 219, 382, 396). As each ele-
ment of Miranda was read, Officer Sneddon, the guidance 
supervisor and the guidance couns1elor assured themselves 
that each respondent understood and comprehended his 
Miranda rights (T. 315, 323, 343, 347, 361, 362). AN of 
the students questioned, including the respondents, waived 
their rights under Miranda (T. 396, 397). 
Subsequent to the Miranda warning, each respondent 
confessed to his part in the alleged crime and signed a 
statement to thait effect (T. 316, 324, 325, 344, 357, 358, 
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362, 363, 365) . Prior if:Jo trial, a hearing was held pursuant 
to defense counsell's motion to suppress the statements (T. 
160). No determination as to the admissibility of the sfate-
ments was made by the court. Immediatey after the hear-
fag on the motion the trial commenced (T. 229). After the 
evidence was presented, including the written sfatements 
made to Officer Sneddon by the respondents, final argu-
ment made and the jury instru0ted, a vierdict of guHty was 
returned against eaoh respondent (T. 510, 51'1, 512, 513). 
Subsequent to the verdict, defense counsel moved the court 
for an order in arrest of judgment alleging that the state-
ments made by the respondents were improper'ly obtained 
because they were not advised of their Miranda rights by 
their guidance during periods of questioning prior 
to Officer Sneddon questioning them; and, because 
guidance counselor had advised them to tell the truth if 
involved in the investigation (T. 514). The court granted 
the motion (T. ·518) and in so doing said: 
"This court feels rbhat it's within the purview 
of the decisions of the so-caned Earl Warren Court 
·that no statement, oral or written, can be taken 
from anyone within these fifty states when the ac-
cusatory pha;se is commenced without the giving of 
Miranda warnings." (T. 515). 
* * * * 
"As long as I sit here, I will not receive any con-
fessions by 1any school offiicer, any peace officer if 
·such 'be baaed on a secret private confession there-
:tofore <>btained, without giving the Miranda warn-




THE STATE IS LEGALLY ENTITLED TO 
PROSECUTE AN APPEAL IN THIS CASE. 
Utah Oode Ann. § 77-39-4(2) (1953) provides, " ... 
an appea'l may be taken by the state: * * * (2) From 
an order arresting judgment." 
'Dhe facts in the instant case show rthat after rthe jury 
verdict 1was in, and pursuant to a motion by defense counsel, 
the trial oourt ordered an arrest of judgment (T. 518). As 
a consequence the State has the right of appeal as specified 
by the foregoing statute. 
POINT II. 
THE RESPONDENTS WERE NOT ENTITLED 
TO THE MIRANDA WARNING WHEN DIS-
CUSSING THE ALLEGED CRIME WITH 
THEIR GUIDANCE COUNSELORS PRIOR TO 
THEIR BEING QUESTIONED OFFICIALLY 
BY OFFICER SNEDDON. 
A. THE RESPONDENTS WERE NOT TAKEN 
INTO CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION BY 
THEIR GUIDANCE COUNSELORS. 
B. THE GUIDANCE COUNSELORS WERE 
NOT LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS. 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), the 
United States Supreme Court held: 
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" ... The prooecution may not use statements, 
whether exculpatory or inculpa:tory, stemming from 
custodial interrogation of the defendant . . . By 
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning in-
itiated by Uiw enforcement officers after a person 
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived 
of his freedom of action in any significant way." 
Id. at 444. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, according to the Miranda standard, two elements 
must exist before the incriminating statement of an ac-
cused is inadmissible: (1) custodial interrogation, by (2) 
'1aw enforcement officers. 
In light of these two elements embodied in Miranda, 
can it be said that the respondents in the instant case were 
.denied their rights when they were not given the Miranda 
warning by their guidance counselor prior to their dis-
cussing with him events surrounding the alleged crime? 
The appeMant submits that it cannot. 
A. THE RESPONDENTS WERE NOT TAKEN 
INTO CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION BY 
THEIR GUIDANCE COUNSELORS. 
In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964), it was 
said: 
"We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the 
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an 
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particu-
Uir suspect . . . and the police have not eff ecrtively 
warned him of his absolute constitutional right to 
remain silent . . . that no statement elicited by the 
police during the interrogation may be used against 





In Miranda, in a footnote to the exp'lanartion of cus-
todial interrogation, it was said: 
"This is what we meant in Escobedo when we 
spoke of an investigation which had focused on an 
accused." 384 U.S. at 444, n. 4. (Emphasis added.) 
The facts of :bhe instant case clearly show that all rela-
tionships between the guidance couns1elors and the students, 
<including the respondents herein, were prior to the time 
when the investigation had focused on a partJicufar suspect. 
The initial names of students to be questioned were ob-
tained by guidance counselors pursuant to dormitory meet-
ings where students in attendance merely offered what help 
they could (T. 185). Sure1y at 1Jhis point in a general in-
vestigation the Miranda warning is not a prerequisite to 
receiving answers either by a guidance counselor or a police 
nor does Miranda so ho'ld. State v. Williams,· 5 
N. C. App. 260, 168 S. E. 2d 217, 218 (1969). Moreover, 
the arm of law .enforcement had not at this time focused on 
any particular person or persons. 
Subsequent to the obtaJining of the names, Officer 
Sneddon directed Stanley • .the Guidance Supervisor, 
to ask 1students whose names were ilisted to come to his 
office for genera[ questioning ( T. 186, 246) . Most of these 
requests we:rie executed through 1:Jhe guidance counselor of 
the student (T. 186, 246). When the respondeillts went for 
questioning they were accompanied by it'heir counselor, an 
occurrence totaMy in accord with school poUcy (T. 245). 
Since school policy required thalt students be accompanied 
by their guidance counselor when questioned by persons not 
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associated with the school, there can be no inference that 
the counselors' presence in any way imposed a constructive 
custody on the respondents or "deprived (their) freedom of 
action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 444 (1966). During this period of the investiga-
tion the respondents were at no time advised they 
were being taken into police custody as one suspected of 
having committed the crime. Moreover, the respondents 
were not placed under arrest ( T. 335) either prior to or 
immediately after the questioning by Officer Sneddon. As 
a matter of fact, he did not know of their whereabouts 
either before or after the questioning (T. 391, 394). 
During this portion of the investigation, prior 1Jo Offi-
cer Sneddon's questioning of each respondent, the respon-
dents never left the premises of the school. They were 
continually in familiar surroundings to which they were 
accustomed. As stated in Miranda: 
" ... compulsion to speak in the tisolated setting 
of the police station may be .greater rthan in courts 
or other official investigations where there are 
often impartial observers to guard against intimidar 
tion or trickery." 384 U. S. at 461. (Emphasis 
added.) 
'.Dhe very purpose of the presence of the guidance 
was to represent the best interests of the student (T. 245, 
246) and to prevent "intimidation or trickery." 
The fact that the respondents were placed in a room 
adjacent the office used for questioning cannot be con-
strued as custodial interrogation. The respondents were 
placed there for administrative purposes only. They waited 
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there until is was their turn to be questioned (T. 193, 246, 
247). The purpose of their waiting in the room was to 
protect them from the scornful eyes of their peers ( T. 193, 
247), thus sparing them unwarranted intimidation and 
harassment from other students (T. 320, 321). The re-
spondents 1were asked to waiit in the adjacent rooms for 
only a short time (T. 315, 319, 321, 342, 359, 360, 365). 
Moreover, often they were left alone (T. 321, 342) with the 
doors unlocked (T. 342). Clearly these administrative pre-
cau1tions did not amount to custodia:l interrogation as de-
fined in Miranda. Consequently there was no legal respon-
sibility on the guidance counselor to advise each respondent 
of any Miranda rights. 
In a recent case, whose factual setting very similar 
to the instant case, the Ninth Oircuit refused to find cus-
todial interrogation. In United States v. Manglona, 414 F. 
2d 642 (9th Cir. 1969), the defendant, who was employed 
in the accounting orffice of a N avail installation on Guam, 
forged a goverrunent check. He volunfarily agreed to be 
questioned by a special agent dispatched to rthe insta1'lation 
to investigate the incident. Priior to the questioning the 
agent failed to completely advise the defendant of his 
Miranda rights. During the questioning the defendant 
made incriminating statements which were later admitted 
into evidence at trial. On appeal the Oircuit Court ruled 
that no reversal was warranted on the basis of the incom-
plete Miranda warning because the questioning was not 
custodial interrogation: 
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"The evidence shows, however, that Manglona 
was not in actuail custody at the time of the inter-
view. Nor did he testify that he thought he was in 
custody alt that time. Moreover, Manglona was 
specifically told that he was not under arrest and 
was free to terminate the interview at any time. As 
soon as the :interview was over, Manglona did leave 
the Special Agent's Office. 
"Under these circumstances it cannot be said 
that, at the time of .the questionring, defendant was 
in custody or otherwise depri V'ed of hris freedom of 
action in any significant way." (Citations ommit-
ted.) Id. at 644. 
If Manglona was not in custodfal interrogation during 
the actual questioning by the Special Agent, then clearly 
the respondents in rthe ,instant case were not in custodial 
interrogation by their guidance counselors prtor to Officer 
Sneddon's questioning them. 
Because custodfal interrogation is necessary before the 
Miranda warning must be given and because the facts ·Show 
the respondents not to have ·been in such ousfody by their 
guidance counselors, it 'is clear that the ltrfa!l court erred in 
granting the mo:bion for an order in arrest of judgment. 
Miranda does not go as far as the trial court suggests; thus, 
it should be reversed and the verdict of guHty reinstated. 
B. THE GUIDANCE COUNSELORS WERE 
NOT LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS. 
The second eilement required before the Miranda warn-
ing is necessary is that the questioning be conducted by a 
police off:icer. In the dnstanJt case the guidance counselors 
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cannot be construed as being police officers or law enforce-
ment officers. Their function is to assist the student with 
his problems and counsel writh him on matters leading to an 
education and a useful life (T. 246). 
In People v. Ronald W. (Anonymous), 24 N. Y. 2d 
732, 249 N. E. 2d 882 (1969), ,the question of whether or 
not a probation officer was a law enforcement officer 
within the spirit and meall!ing of Miranda was decided: 
"Viewed in this perspective, rit is apparent that 
rtJhe probation officers were not required to give ap-
peHant the Miranda warnings before :they inquired 
about the needle marks on h!is arm. The questioning 
of the appeHant was hardly ithe sort of incommuni-
cado, pc>lice-dominated atmosphere of custodial in-
terrogation and overbearing of the subject's wiH alt 
which the Miranda rule wa's aimed. The clearly 
stated objectives of education and reihabilitation 
which are always paramount in the rclationship 
between the probation officer and the probationer 
(citations omirtted) are totally foreign to the ele-
ments the Supreme Court addressed itself to in 
Miranda." 249 N. E. 2d at 883. 
In Clark v. State, 222 S. 2d 766 (Fla. 1969), the Court 
1said on this issue : 
"It seems to us that he (probaJtion officer) can 
be of most usefulness in the rehabiHltation of those 
who have erred if he is not compelled to act like a 
policeman instead of a sympathetic supervisor . . . 
We find nOltJhing wrong in his Clark about 
an aHeged vidlaJtion of probation, and having been 
informed of it he is under a duty to advise the court, 
which he did." Id. at 767. 
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See also, Bean v. Carlos, 21 Utah 2d 309, 445 P. 2d 144 
(1968) ,; Ouletta v. State, 442 S. W. 2d 216 (Ark. 1969); 
People v. Omell, 15 Mich. App. 154, 166 N. W. 2d 279 
(1968). 
The appellant submits that ·the guidance counselors in 
the instant case are analogous to the probation officers of 
rthe cases cited above in that their function, like that of 
the probation officer, is one of couns1el and rehabilitation 
and not t!hat of law enforcement. This negates any duty 
on their part to administer rthe Miranda warning prior to 
speaking with their assigned students about their aHeged 
involvement in the incident in question. 
The evidence ris clear rbhat :the guidance counselors did 
in fact discuss the incident with the respondents prior to 
their being questioned by Officer Sneddon (T. 314, 315, 
341, 342, 343, 360, 365). At no time was the Miranda warn-
ing given 1as a predicate rto these discuss1ions. However, in 
light of the .foregoing, 1it was not ilegally necessary that 
such admonition be given. 
POINT III. 
THE RESPONDENTS WERE PROPERLY AD-
VISED OF THEIR MIRANDA RIGHTS BY 
OFFICER SNEDDON, AND HAVING A FULL 
UNDERSTANDING THEREOF, VOLUNTAR-
ILY, KNOWINGLY, AND INTELLIGENTLY 
WAIVED THE SAME. 
The record clearly supports the fact that each respon-
dent was given the Miranda warning prior to being ques-
tioned by Officer Sneddon (T. 219, 315, 323, 343, 347, 361, 
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362 365, 382, 396). The facts of the case also support the 
conclusion that each respondent understood his right under 
Miranda and voluntarHy and knQlwingly waived the same. 
The Miranda case aHows for a .suspect in custodial in-
terroga:tion to waiive his Miranda rights. 384 U. S. at 444. 
However, such a waiver wil'l not be found from a silent 
record. 384 U. S. at 475. Moreover, the state has the bur-
den of estab1ishing that such a waiver occurred. .384 U. S. 
at 475. In United States v. Hayes, 385 F. 2d 375 (4th Cir. 
1967), the court held: 
". . . the cases in which it is clear that the 
Miranda warnings have been given must be con-
sidel:'ed on rtJheir iown facts in order to determine 
the questiion of waiver. The courts must do this on 
an ad hoc basis, and no per se rule has thus flar been 
adopted dealing wi'th this problem." Id. at 377. 
In light of the foregoing principles it is neces:sary to ana-
lyze the facts of the instant case in deciding whether or not 
the respondents herein waived their Miranda rights. 
In all cases each respondent was given the Miranda 
warning (T. 219, 382). Although the reoord shows that in 
some instances no affirmative waiver was made, :it is clear 
that immediately upon receiving the warning, and aifirma-
·tively vioicing an understanding thereof, each respondent 
made incriminating sltaJtements (T. 316, 3213, 344, 347, 357, 
362, 366). These statements were not subsequent to a !Jong 
'Period of custodial interro.gation or obtained lby trickery or 
cajoling, 'they came voluntarily subsequent to ·a complete 
and full understanding of their Miranda rights. None of 
the respondents were longer than 5 to 40 min-
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utes (T. 224, 315, 330, 365). In People v. Johnson, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 401, 450 P. 2d 865 ( 1969), the court said: 
"Once the defendant has been informed of his 
rights and indicates that he understands those 
rights, it would seem that his choosing to speak and 
not reques,ting a lawyer is ·sufficient Avidence that 
he knows of his rights and chooses not to exercise 
them." 450 P. 2d at 876. 
It may be contended arguendo that the r·espondents, 
because of their race and lack of educaltion, were not cap-
a:ble of understanding their Miranda rights and thus could 
not knowingly and intelligently waive them. However, the 
evidence contained in the record is contra. 
According to a reading vocabulary and reading com-
prehension exam the respondents' reading ability varied 
from grade 5.8 to 7.3 (T. 165). However, the Miranda 
warning was given verbally. The evidence established that 
the grade level of the respondents relative to oral instruc-
:1Jions and communication was at least three grades above 
the reading level, i.e., 8.8 to 10.3 (T. 169). 
In State v. Thornton, 22 Utah 2d 140, 449 P. 2d 987 
(1969), this Court held that the defendant adequately 
waived his Miranda rights although he had but a fourth 
grade education and could not read or write. His intelli-
gence quotient was about 68. This Court said regarding the 
question of waiver: 
" ... the question must be resolved from exam-
ining 'the whole record, - which we have done in 
the insltant case and see no error in the trial courts 
admitting the confession in evidence or the jury in 
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adjudging defendant guilty as charged." 449 P. 2d 
at 988. 
In light of the respondents' educational levels in the instant 
case, and in Thornton, it is clear tha!t the respondents were 
capable of understanding their Miranda rights pursuant to 
waiving them. 
Moreover, the guidance counselors of each respondent 
testified that the respondent over which he was assigned 
knew and unders1tood English and was performing either 
average or above average in his academic work (T. 312, 
322, 341, 361, 362, 364). 
In some instances, if one of tJhe respondents appeared 
to not understand any of the Miranda warning, 
the guidance counselor was there to make further explana-
tion and clarify the difficulty (T. 344, 361). GeneraJlly no 
such explanation was necessary. 
In 1liglrt of the whole record it is clear that the re-
spondents were capable of understanding their Miranda 
rights; that they did so understand those rights and pur-
suant thereto did voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently 
waive the same. Their immediaJte incriminating 'Statements 
evidences this concilusion. Therefore, it was error for the 
trial court to a:llow the case to be decided by the jury and 
then subsequent 'bo a verdict of guilty negaite the sam{;! by 
an order in arrest of judgment. 
POINT IV. 
THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY IS 
NOT AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE. 
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Although the State is the appellant in this case there 
is no double jeopardy issue involved. Double jeopardy con-
stitutionally protects victims of the criminal judicial pro-
cess from being tried twice for the 1same crime. U.S. Const. 
Amend. V. As a consequence, this Court, in cases hereto-
fore appealed by the State, wherein trial courts have been 
reversed, has barred the state from further pro.secu:tion 
because the basis for appeal occurred after jeopardy at-
tached, but prior to a final verdict. State v. Iverson, 10 
Utah 2d 171, 350 P. 2d 152 (1960), State v. Sandman, 4 
Uta:h 2d 69, 286 P. 2d 1060 (1955). 
In the Jnstant case, the basis for the State's appeal 
arose after both the time jeopardy attached and a jury ver-
dict. It is 'the State's contention that the jury verdict should 
be reinstated, thus negating the need for a new trial on 
the grounds tJhait the trial court's order in arrest of judg-
ment was error. As a consequence there is no double 
jeopardy issue Jn this case and rthus, it 1is clearly distinguish-
able from the Iverson and Sandman cases cited above. 
CONCLUSION 
It is lthe State',s contention thart the respondents herein 
were not constitutionally entitled to a Miranda warning 
from their school counselors prior to their being questioned 
by Officer Sneddon; thart Officer Sneddon properly gave 
the respondents the Miranda warning prior to their cus-
todial interrogation; that the respondents were capable of 
understanding their Miranda rights and that they did in 
fact so understand those rights; that pursuant to said un-
derstanding they knowingly, intelligently and understand-
17 
ingly waived their Miranda rights and made focriminating 
staitemenrts to Officer Sneddon, whieh were properly used 
at trial; that based thereon, the jury correctly returned a 
verdict of guillty and that the subsequent order of the court 
granting a motion in arrest of judgment iwas :in error. 
'Dhus, the order granting the motion in arrest of judgment 
shouM be reversed, thereby reinstating fue jury verdict of 
guilty. 
Respectfuny submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUR,EN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
SaJlt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for AppeUant 
